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ABSTRACT: Public understanding of climate change turns significantly on epistemic trust and distrust of those 
claiming rational-social authority. Attending to the ethics of expert/non-expert trust relations and to argumentation 
and rhetoric in popular climate discourse, I argue, illustrates the importance of epistemic trustworthiness for the 
social propagation of climate scientific knowledge.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public understanding of climate change is a curious thing for social epistemological scrutiny. 
No subject of observation and conversation is more generic than the weather. Unlike chemical 
bonds, alleles, or leptons, many climatological phenomena make themselves apparent to the 
unaided inexpert eye. Strikingly, 19% of respondents to a 2008 survey identified “personal 
observations of warmer temperatures in their local communities” as their primary factor for 
belief in global warming, tied with glacial melting (19%) and changing weather patterns (18%) 
as most frequent answers (Borick, 2010, p. 33). For skeptics, personal observations (42%) was 
the most frequent factor identified for disbelief, well ahead of natural explanations (19%) and 
insufficient scientific evidence (11%) (Borick, 2010, p. 35). Both believing and disbelieving 
members of the American public are apparently looking to their own climate assessments as 
especially evidentially significant.  
 These things may tempt us into misunderstanding climate change as something we 
each can know on our own; yet the best evidence for climate change available to us doesn’t 
admit of strictly independent individual assessment. As with much scientific knowledge, our 
grasp on anthropogenic climate change and appropriate responses to it turns on epistemic 
dependence: not only wary reliance on others’ empirical or evaluative claims, but also relations 
of epistemic trust. Such dependencies include trust among climate researchers (no one of 
whom could do all the work alone) and public trust and distrust toward testimonies from those 
who earn—or claim—authority on global climate.  
 To be sure, public understanding of climate change is not monolithic but includes 
many publics with varying experiences, capabilities, and commitments. Yet would any of us be 
wise to pursue strict self-reliance on climatological beliefs? Consider me: even if I have good 
grasp of the greenhouse effect, this and my observations of local temperatures and weather 
patterns would be weak justification for any particular beliefs on global climate change. 
Whether my observations even constitute evidence for anthropogenic climate change and not 
another cause is unclear to my unaided evaluation; I cannot reliably judge its evidential 
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relevance myself. As Hardwig (1994) emphasized in his work on epistemic dependency, it 
would be positively irrational of me to attempt strictly autonomous assessment, as it would be 
for one researcher to comprehensively measure global temperatures entirely by herself, 
neglectful of the rich social-evidential resource of trustworthy testimony.  
 Epistemic dependency may be recognized as useful, rational and responsible. When 
the scope of this dependency is obscured, however, expert and non-expert parties to trust 
relations are made vulnerable to exploitation of this trust. Vulnerability to exploitation of trust 
is urgent when the knowledge claims are political and controversial, as popular discourse 
continues to frame anthropogenic climate change. My hope is that by attending to the 
sometimes-neglected ethical dimensions of citizen-scientist epistemic dependency, understood 
in terms of trust and distrust, we may better appreciate how public understanding of climate 
change requires trustworthiness. Drawing on Baier and other trust theorists, I model public 
understanding of climate science as nested/overlapping trust relations, each with potential for 
promise and exploitation depending on their moral health. I find that the rhetoric and 
argumentation deployed in popular discourse on climate provide many illustrations for how 
untrustworthiness erodes the moral health of citizen-scientist epistemic dependency. I look to a 
range of climate-science testimonies including the recent dispute over climate science 
consensus between the Marshall Institute and the authors of Merchants of Doubt. In this way I 
offer a preliminary explication of role-specific duties of trustworthiness for morally and 
epistemically healthy public understanding of climate change.  
2. TRUST AND CLIMATE SCIENCE 
Solomon and Flores observed that trust relationships enable remarkable freedom: “not only the 
freedom from suspicion and distrust but the freedom to realize all sorts of possibilities … the 
freedom to engage in projects which one could not or would not undertake on one’s own” 
(2001, pp. 7–8). This applies not only to business and personal relationships, but our collective 
understanding of global climatological phenomena as well. An enterprise necessarily broadly 
extended over space, time, and specialization, climate science is just the sort of project these 
authors recognize as made possible by mutual trust.  
 Solomon and Flores acknowledged their debt to Baier’s work on trust, especially 
“Trust and Antitrust.” Baier (1986) emphasized that trust is messy: it can be thrust upon us 
without consent, unrecognized by one or more parties to it, rational and irrational, morally 
healthy and rotten. Perhaps most important is her characterization of trust as a dependency 
distinctive from what she calls mere reliance. Specifically, Baier saw trust as not simply 
prediction and reliance on another’s steady habits, but reliance by the trustor on the good will 
of the trusted toward her and the object of her trust. Characteristic of genuine trust 
relationships for Baier is its notable discretion: that is, the trusting person allows the other 
some discretion in determining how to meet her trust, such that the stronger the trust, the more 
discretion the trusted person is afforded (Baier, 1986, pp. 234–237). Discretion is the source of 
the powerful freedom noted by Solomon and Flores and also what renders the trustor 
vulnerable to betrayal as the merely reliant person is not. “One leaves others the opportunity to 
harm one when one trusts, and also shows one’s confidence that they will not take it” (Baier, 
1986, p. 235). Rational trust, then, requires “good grounds for such confidence in another’s 
good will, or at least the absence of good grounds for expecting their ill will or indifference” 
(Baier, 1986, p. 235). 
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 Karen Jones’s (1996) account of trust as an affective attitude is also significantly 
indebted to Baier, though Jones did criticize Baier for neglecting the full significance of the 
trustor’s expectation of the trusted’s good will and responsiveness. Jones characterized trust as 
“an attitude of optimism that the good will and competence of another will extend to cover the 
domain of our interaction with her, together with the expectation that the trusted will be 
directly and favorably moved by the thought that we are counting on her” (1996, p. 4). She was 
less interested in any entrusted object than the situation of the trust relationship. Paul Faulkner 
(2007) offered a similar portrait in epistemology contrasting affective and predictive trust. In 
the latter, Faulkner noted, the listener trusts the speaker to do something in the sense that he 
knowingly expects she’ll be doing it, but doesn’t expect anything of her. By contrast, trusting 
affectively means the listener actually expects that the speaker “recognizes his need to know 
whether p, and presumes that the speaker’s telling him that p is a response to this” (Faulkner, 
2007, p. 888).  
 Just as it is possible to merely rely without genuinely trusting, it is possible to learn 
from testimony without actually trusting it. We sometimes might find ourselves forced to rely 
on claims made by those we don’t find trustworthy, perhaps because of the paucity of 
alternatives. In such situations we warily rely, as one might rely on but not trust in a damaged 
car to get to the hospital because it’s the only available means. In these cases, we have not 
exactly opened ourselves to the possibility of betrayal since we have no real expectations of 
trustworthiness. To be sure, even without the vulnerability Baier identified as distinctive of 
trust, mere reliance on the unreliable can be costly. I may not be surprised when a shrimp 
cocktail at a bar in Iowa gives me food poisoning, but lack of betrayal may be modest solace. 
 The ampliative potential of epistemic trust as I here understand it means that trusting 
non-expert recipients of trustworthy expert testimony may acquire further grounds for belief 
beyond that available through mere-reliance alone. Consider the social-evidential significance 
of reflective belief in anthropogenic climate change by a supermajority of climate researchers. 
Here public trust and distrust by varied publics toward scientific opinion makes a big epistemic 
difference. Those who trust have reason to find great evidential significance in the percentage 
of scientists in agreement because we trust these scientists have come to their common beliefs 
not through deceit, conspiracy or groupthink but through their reflective expert assessments of 
empirical evidence, models, and fellow scientists’ trustworthiness. Those who actively distrust 
climate scientists will place less evidential significance in lopsided expert opinion in favor of 
anthropogenic climate change. For example, Gardiner explained that novelist Michael 
Crichton, author of the conspiratorial climate-skeptical State of Fear, is dismissive of climate 
research because he “distrusts the data and methods of the scientists whose work is 
summarized by the IPCC” (2011, p. 460). Lastly consider a third public that neither trusts nor 
distrusts: they do not consider climate-scientific expert testimony trustworthy, neither do they 
dismiss it as untrustworthy. For this third group, lopsided opinion among scientists on climate 
change is a striking fact requiring explanation. Absent trust and distrust, they neither 
confidently attribute it to independent epistemic achievement nor to conspiracy.  
3. MORAL ROT IN TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
“Most of us notice a given form of trust most easily after its sudden demise or serious injury. 
We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere and notice it as we notice air, only 
when it becomes scarce or polluted,” Baier (1986, p. 234) observed. What is polluted trust? 
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Here Baier proposed what I consider an excellent moral test for trust relationships which we 
should extend to moral evaluations of citizen-scientist epistemic trust in public understanding 
of climate change. She articulated a test of the “moral decency” of trust relationships thusly: 
More generally, to the extent that what the truster relies on for the continuance of the trust relation 
is something which, once realized by the truster, is likely to lead to (increased) abuse of trust, and 
eventually to destabilization and destruction of the relation, the trust is morally corrupt. 
 A trust relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on qualities in the 
other which would be weakened by the knowledge that the other relies on them. (Baier, 1986, pp. 
255-256) 
Trustworthy citizen-scientist interdependency on climate change, I submit, should be able to 
pass Baier’s expressibility test.  
 To illustrate let us consider the “skeptical environmentalist’s guide to global 
warming,” Lomborg’s Cool It. The book opens with a striking claim: “Global warming has 
been portrayed recently as the greatest crisis in the history of civilization” (Lomborg, 2007, ix). 
For this claim the author has given no reference or citation. The reader has been immediately 
asked to trust: specifically to trust that this vivid description accurately captures the arguments 
of Lomborg’s opponents, or perhaps another way of putting the point, to trust that ‘greatest 
crisis historically’ even has any actually advocating referent and is not just an arresting 
strawman. Whose view of global warming is this: a climate researcher in a peer-reviewed 
article, IPCC report, newsmagazine, Science Times article, anonymous blog post? The reader 
has been asked to trust the author that this claim has an advocate worth engaging; if that’s not 
the case, the reader’s engagement of the author’s critique is predicated on ignorance of its 
strawman status.  
 A similar requirement of trust in the accurate characterization of unnamed opponents’ 
views undergirded Patrick Michaels’s criticism of what he calls “the Popular Vision” of global 
climate, in his 1992 book Sound and Fury published by the Cato Institute. The Popular Vision 
as Michaels described can be quite radical: for example, “One of the general tenets of those 
who subscribe to the Popular Vision is that there is a consensus among scientists that the end is 
at hand” (1992, p. 181). Readers have not been clearly informed what “the end is at hand” 
means, nor exactly to whom Michaels has ascribed this apocalyptic view; we have been 
implicitly invited to trust the author that the Popular Vision is not a strawman.  
 The rhetorical practice of putting a maligned view in quotation marks without 
reference to an actually identified advocate also turns for efficacy on the author-reader trust 
relationship. Notice: should these apparent quotes fail to have actually identifiable referents, 
continuance of this trust relationship is predicated on the reader’s ignorance of that fact. In his 
introduction to Climate Coup, published by Cato, the editor said, “We are repeatedly told that 
‘the science is settled’ on global warming (whatever that means) because of what is in our 
scientific journals” (Michaels, 2011, p. 1). Perhaps Michaels had in mind Oreskes (2004; 2007) 
on climate science consensus based on peer-reviewed climate research; but he didn’t cite 
Oreskes or anyone else. Notice the rhetorical pull of Michaels’s phrasing: ‘the science is 
settled’ has been introduced without an actually identified advocate and belittled as overly 
vague. Of course the vagueness criticism only works if readers can trust the author’s 
implication that unnamed people of authority say this. 
 For another instance of apparent yet unattributed quotation, let us return to Cool It. “In 
public debates, the argument I hear most often is a variant of ‘If global warming is going to kill 
us all and lay waste to the world, this has to be our top priority —everything else you talk 
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE SCIENCE AND THE ETHICS OF EXPERTISE 
33 
about, including HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, free trade, malaria, and clean drinking water may be 
noble but it is utterly unimportant compared to global warming’” (Lomborg, 2007, p. 124). 
Note that the argument relayed here (against which the author organized his book) has been 
given in quotation marks, inviting the reader to imagine actual advocates voicing the very 
words; indeed, we have been invited to imagine many different people frequently saying them 
to Lomborg’s consternation. But since no reference is provided for these ‘quoted’ words, the 
reader must trust the author’s implication that they accurately capture his adversaries’ views. 
This is no small matter, since Cool It is built around the following thesis:  
That humanity has caused a substantial rise in atmospheric carbon-dioxide levels over the past 
centuries, thereby contributing to global warming, is beyond debate. What is debatable, however, is 
whether hysteria and headlong spending on extravagant CO2-cutting programs at an unprecedented 
price is the only possible response. Such a course of action is especially debatable in a world where 
billions of people live in poverty, where millions die of curable diseases, and where these lives 
could be saved, societies strengthened, and environments improved at a fraction of the cost. 
(Lomborg, 2007, ix)  
Note two dilemmas that have been presented in this passage. First, Lomborg has attributed 
(what he critiqued as a false dilemma) to unnamed experts the claim that we must commit to 
hysterical, extravagant, unprecedentedly expensive programs or do nothing. No advocate of 
carbon-cutting programs as essential would describe them as hysterical or extravagant, so 
Lomborg has rejected (as-yet uncited proponents’) plans even in his very description of them. 
If the reader is to be moved, she must trust Lomborg’s prior assessment that actually advocated 
programs are hysterical and extravagant. The second dilemma, Lomborg endorsed: either 
engage in CO2-cutting programs or address urgent global problems of poverty and disease. 
Readers have not been given evidence why we must choose between these horns of the 
dilemma, nor evidence why global climate change should be thought unrelated to problems of 
global poverty, disease, conflict, and displacement. Again, readers have been implicitly asked 
to trust Lomborg’s assessment of the dilemma as valid. The closest he comes to arguing for the 
dilemma is this generic assertion: “The world lacks the resources and will to solve all its major 
challenges. Focusing on some issues puts others on the back burner” (Lomborg, 2007, p. 47).  
 In these rhetorical choices readers are made vulnerable to potential exploitation of 
trust. Recall Baier’s proposed test for moral rot. If in fact the presented dilemma is overly 
simplistic, if actually advocated emissions-reduction plans are not obviously hysterical or 
extravagant, if “the greatest crisis in the history of civilization” fails to accurately describe 
opponents’ views or has no actual referent, then continuance of the trust relationship between 
author and readers is predicated on the author’s reliance on readers’ ignorance of these things.* 
The next sections consider the further vulnerabilities of trust in climate claims to moral rot: 
specifically regarding climate consensus, ascriptions of credibility, non-expert expectations, 
and abdication of good scientific communication skills across epistemic differences.  
  
                                                
*  Jean Goodwin argues that Lomborg is engaged in advocacy, and as such, does not invite a trust relationship 
with readers. This is intriguing and worth further attention, but as yet it is not clear to me that advocacy 
precludes trust.    
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4. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CLIMATE-SCIENCE CONSENSUS 
The epistemic asymmetry involved in citizen-scientist trust relationship makes them a rich 
social-epistemic resource but also enables their exploitation. When expert testifiers depend on 
their recipients’ lack of expertise in order to propagate their favored interpretation, they fail 
Baier’s moral test. When a trusted speaker or writer relies on trusting recipients’ unfamiliarity 
with a range of alternatives on a disputed issue within a scientific community, for example, or 
relies on the fact that trusting recipients are unaware of one’s own or others’ credibility among 
experts, the attendant epistemic trust is morally corrupt. These problems are nicely illustrated, I 
think, by contemporary debate over the existence of a climate-science consensus. 
 Testimony reinforcing or challenging the idea of a climate science consensus need not 
raise special moral concerns; but it certainly can, when presented ambiguously, vaguely, in a 
way that preys on public ignorance of how consensus is being operationally defined.  
 Naomi Oreskes (2004; 2007) has defined climate science consensus in a way that is 
plausible, specific, and transparent. She has grounded her assessment of scientific consensus in 
comprehensive analysis of peer-reviewed journal articles published 1993–2003: approximately 
900 articles on a search of “global climate change.” Oreskes found that none were offered as 
refuting to the notion that “global climate change is occurring, and human activities are at least 
part of the reason why;” approximately one-fifth explicitly endorsed the view that 
anthropogenic climate change was the main force behind current climate change, 
approximately half affirmed this view implicitly (2004; 2007). This finding of climate-
scientific consensus as operationally defined by peer-reviewed journal publication informed 
Oreskes’s popular work with Conway (2008; 2010) and has been often cited in climate ethics 
as evidence against a real debate among climate scientists (cf. Garvey, 2008; Gardiner, 2011; 
Shrader-Frechette, 2011). We might contrast Oreskes’s model of climate consensus with Bray 
(2010), who directly challenged her analysis by appealing to the results of three surveys, each 
with approximately 350-550 respondents of alleged climate scientists. Twenty years ago, Fred 
Singer similarly rejected a climate consensus by appealing to collected survey results (cf. 
Michaels, 1992, 181). Those who reject the idea of an expert climate science consensus 
frequently cite petitions, surveys, and private admissions of doubts (cf. Barth, 1998, pp. 8-9; 
Singer, 2000, p. 39).  
 For their part, Oreskes and Conway acknowledged and even emphasized in their 
historical analysis that there have been and still are some scientists like Fred Singer and Fred 
Seitz that argue contrary to the scientific consensus to build doubt about the extent of human 
contribution to climate change (2008; 2010). These skeptical claims have been given less 
through original peer-reviewed climate research, Oreskes and Conway observed, and more 
through other socially and politically influential channels of communication: newspaper or 
magazine editorials, letters to the editor, think-tank book publication and white papers, and 
private conversations with policymakers (2008; 2010). A principal target of criticism in 
Merchants of Doubt is the George C. Marshall Institute, an American think-tank with funding 
from tobacco, energy and other industry groups. Shortly after publication of Merchants of 
Doubt, the Marshall Institute gave a critical response to Oreskes and Conway’s book through 
its newsletter. Titled “Clouding the Truth,” it opened with a quote from Galileo—“In questions 
of science, the authority of a thousand is not worth the humble reasoning of a single 
individual” — meant to set the tone.  
 O’Keefe and Kueter (2010) defended Seitz and other Marshall Institute colleagues as 
conscientious researchers pushing against scientific hegemony. The issue of consensus is key:  
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First, Oreskes-Conway assert the importance of consensus – these scientists were on the wrong side 
of the scientific consensus, they state. Science is not a popularity contest and scientific history is 
replete with examples of consensus views that were flat-out wrong. Second, Oreskes-Conway say 
these scientists ‘fought the scientific evidence.’ That should surprise no one. In fact, if the opposite 
were true, we all should be very concerned. Challenging the theory, hypothesis, and evidence is 
after all, the basis of modern science. (O’Keefe & Kueter, 2010, p. 1) 
 Nevertheless, Oreskes-Conway criticized Seitz, Jastrow, and Nierenberg for rejecting the 
scientific consensus that anthropogenic factors will cause dramatic climate change. To bolster their 
support for an alleged consensus, Oreskes-Conway offer a strong defense for the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The recent Climategate revelations should be sufficient to give 
anyone pause when examining the openness and credibility of the IPCC process…In reality, the 
only consensus is among those on a [IPCC report] writing team. (O’Keefe & Kueter, 2010, p. 6) 
Let us attend carefully to how O’Keefe and Kueter have been framing consensus. In insisting 
that science is “not a popularity contest,” their implication was that Oreskes-Conway 
understand scientific consensus as what the majority of scientists endorse. While going by the 
numbers on experts’ agreement can be a useful indicator of trustworthiness in facing 
conflicting testimony (cf. Goldman, 2001), this is not how Oreskes measured consensus, as we 
have seen. Though they imply that their colleagues “fought the scientific evidence” in noble 
scientific tradition, they do not remind readers that the fighting occurred outside of peer-
reviewed publication. The issue of peer-reviewed research is not broached in this critique of 
Merchants of Doubt, despite the fact that the historians of science criticized for their climate 
consensus claim explicitly built their analysis from original peer-reviewed climate research. 
 O’Keefe and Kueter also implied that Oreskes-Conway’s consensus claim depends on 
the IPCC report: if the credibility of the IPCC can be successfully impugned by reference to 
“Climategate,” then presumably Oreskes-Conway’s consensus claim is likewise impugned. Yet 
the force of this defense of the Marshall Institute turns on readers’ ignorance of the fact that 
Oreskes’s analysis of climate science consensus was neither a popularity contest nor parasitic 
on the IPCC anyway.  
5. ASCRIPTIONS OF CREDIBILITY  
An ethic of trustworthy scientific expertise should include the ways in which testifiers ascribe 
credibility (or lack thereof) to themselves, their allies, and their opponents.  
 Kristen Shrader-Frechette observed that “virtually no CC dissenters do peer-reviewed-
expert climate research. Most of them are scientifically uninformed, and most are paid by 
special interests, like the oil lobby” (2011, p. 25). She argued that “scientists like Fred Seitz – 
who have never done climate research—have no authority from which to disagree with climate 
scientists who spend their lives doing advanced climate research” (Shrader-Frechette, 2011, pg. 
25), described the Cato Institute, American Enterprise Institute, and Heartland Institute as 
“funded by chemical and fossil-fuel interests,” and denounced scientists paid by these groups 
as decidedly untrustworthy (Shrader-Frechette, 2011, pp. 25–26). Retired physicist Fred 
Singer, she reminded us, has not published advanced climate research; similarly, despite his 
visibility as a climate critic biologist Patrick Michaels has not done climate research, and is 
paid by Cato, an “industry front group” largely funded by coal companies (Shrader-Frechette, 
2011, p. 29).  
 Is this an ad hominem attack, distracting readers from engagement with the real 
issues? I don’t think so. As Shrader-Frechette elucidated, the absence of original peer-reviewed 
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climate research and the presence of industry funding are, taken together, relevant to 
ascriptions of expert credibility. Without the fallible yet socially-epistemologically significant 
filter of peer review, non-expert recipients of these critics’ skeptical testimonies must rely 
more directly on testifiers’ good will and responsiveness. In this, testifiers’ funding sources are 
quite relevant to assessing their affective trustworthiness for those of us not providing that 
funding.  
 By contrast let us consider Singer’s climate-skeptical essay “Cool Planet, Hot 
Politics.” Having cast suspicion on climate researchers funded by government grants, he noted: 
Of course there are think tanks on the other side as well (such as the Cato Institute and the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute), spreading the message that the best information available from 
climate science contradicts the alleged need for drastic policies certain to cause great economic 
harm. Needless to say, these groups don’t get any government money. (Singer, 2000, p. 39)   
The reader has been invited to regard the Cato Institute as especially trustworthy because it 
doesn’t “get any government money.” Yet Singer made no acknowledgement of Cato’s own 
industry funding. He cannot consistently insist that Cato’s funding is irrelevant to the 
credibility of its message and make the point in the quoted passage. Thus the author relied here 
for the force of his claim on readers’ ignorance of Cato’s industry funding. 
 A retired physicist like Singer, skeptical about anthropogenic climate change, need 
not be untrustworthy in choosing to testify publicly to his skeptical beliefs. Yet if he does so in 
a way that depends for its rhetorical force on public ignorance about how well his training and 
experience in physics prepares him to competently assess climatological research, this fails our 
test. Likewise, citing one’s ideological allies to buttress one’s position need not be problematic, 
but it becomes so when the efficacy of citation turns on readers’ ignorance of these allies and 
their credibility.  
6. RECIPIENTS, MEDIA, AND RELUCTANT POPULARIZERS  
Shrader-Frechette observed that laypeople can be misled in several ways in misunderstanding 
climate change. One involves a failure of nonexpert recipients of testimony to appreciate the 
uncertainty inherent to science: laypeople “may be uncomfortable with uncertainty [and] may 
erroneously believe good science should be certain” (Shrader-Frechette, 2011, pp. 24–25), and 
dismiss fallible but reliable climate scientific knowledge. Public misunderstanding may be 
partially a media failure too, by giving a public platform to climate skeptics lacking real expert 
credibility in pursuit of superficial balance (Shrader-Frechette, 2011, p. 25; Gelbspan, 2000, p. 
25). Public confusion may be a failure, thirdly, of scientists with climatological expertise yet 
poor communication skills. Shrader-Frechette put the point thusly:  
After all, advanced-scientific researchers are trained to do demanding technical work and make new 
discoveries, not to popularize science. They are trained to produce knowledge, not disseminate it. 
Indeed, if scientists become popularizers, they typically become suspect among other experts—who 
may think that they cannot do technically-demanding work. Poor expert communication thus can 
leave science open to misrepresentation. (2011, p. 24) 
I take this to be an important point not to be overshadowed by the failures of trustworthiness 
by opportunistic climate skeptics already discussed in detail. Let us recall Jones’s expectation 
criterion for trust. Trustworthy expert testimony means more than just transparency, reliability, 
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and absence of ill will; trustworthy expert facilitation of public scientific understanding means 
a conscientious responsiveness to trusting non-experts’ expectation “that the one trusted will be 
directly and favorably moved by the thought that we are counting on her” (Jones, 1996, p. 4). 
When trusting scientists, we expect them to recognize themselves to be giving testimony, to 
recognize that they are making claims employed by us as evidence for our belief and actions. 
At its most trustworthy, scientific testimony is presented conscientiously: sincerely but further 
with attention to successful recipient uptake. In devaluing good science-popularization, then, 
otherwise fine scientists abdicate a duty of responsible testimony across epistemic difference 
and so fall short of trustworthiness.  
7. CONCLUSION  
To conclude, I have recommended that we be mindful of rhetorical considerations relevant to 
the moral health of epistemic trust relationships undergirding public understanding of climate. 
These include but are not limited to 
• representations of opponents’ commitments and claims 
• operational definitions of climate science consensus 
• ascriptions of credibility to oneself, allies, and opponents 
• non-expert recipients’ expectations of certainty 
• expert researchers’ conscientious communication skills 
My remarks are only a partial articulation of what ethics of expertise may look like for morally 
healthy, mutually conscientious public trust on climate change. I have sought to illustrate the 
importance of reciprocal, role-specific trustworthiness by all parties to our nested, overlapping 
relationships of social-epistemic interdependency.  
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